

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00  
INRE-00 SAA-01 SES-02 SMS-01 ACDA-12 AID-05 EB-08  
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NEAE-00 EUR-12 AF-10 DOEE-00 /138 W  
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O 161335Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY SANA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5705  
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4  
CHUSMTM DHAHRAN  
USMTM RIYADH  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SANA 4053

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR, UR, XF, US  
SUBJ: SOVIETS IN SOUTH ARABIA

BEGIN SUMMARY: CONTAINING THE SOVIETS IN SOUTH YEMEN  
IS A POLICY WHICH WE SHOULD PURSUE BOTH TO CHECK THEIR  
FURTHER EXPANSION, IN THE SHORT RUN, AND WEAKEN THEM IN  
LONG RUN. END SUMMARY.

1. WASHINGTON IS FULL OF SOVIET EXPERTS. BY CONTRAST,  
NO ONE IN EMBASSY SANA IMAGINES HE CAN STAND IN THAT  
CHARMED CIRCLE. PERHAPS, HOWEVER, SOME VIEWS FROM  
ARABISTS ON WHAT OUR SOVIET FRIENDS SEEM TO BE DOING IN  
SOUTH ARABIA AND THE HORN COULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO  
DIALOGUE WHICH SEEMS TO BE GOING ON IN WASHINGTON TODAY  
ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH USSR.

2. FIRST, WE DON'T THINK SOVIETS WOULD THINK OF INVESTING  
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AS MUCH IN SOUTH YEMEN AS THEY HAVE SIMPLY TO SHORE UP  
A PARTY FORM OF RULE. THEY HAVE CLEARLY ACTED FOR GEO-  
POLITICAL REASONS. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SOVIETS REGARD  
WORLD NOT AS DISCRETE PEICES -- COUNTRY "X" OR "Y" WHERE  
THEY HAVE PARTICULAR FRIENDS -- BUT AS ARENA FOR LARGE  
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FORCES WHICH WASH OVER WHOLE  
AREAS. THEY MAY MOVE AS OPPORTUNITIES PRESENT THEMSELVES,

RATHER THAT ON BASIS OF SOME MASTER PLAN, BUT THEIR THINKING IS REGIONAL AND GLOBAL AND AIMED ULTIMATELY AT THE US.

3. THUS, THE SOVIET AIM IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO COMPLICATE OUR ACCESS TO OIL AND OUR ABILITY TO DEAL WITH ANY ARAB REGIME. SOVIET PROPAGANDA, ECONOMIC AID, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND CULTURAL RELATIONSHIPS WERE USED VIGOROUSLY AND VERY SUCCESSFULLY THROUGHOUT FIFTIES AND SIXTIES TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN THE AREA AND WEAKEN US. BASIC TACTIC IN FIFTIES AND SIXTIES FOR SOVIETS WAS TO SUPPORT ARAB NATIONALISTS AND PROGRESSIVES. US, BY CONTRAST, SUPPORTED CONSERVATIVE REGIMES WHICH FEARED NATIONALISM AND PROGRESSIVISM. SOVIETS THUS ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES IN MOST POPULOUS AND MOST SOPHISTICATED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHILE WE, ALIGNED WITH MONARCHIES FOR THE MOST PART, USUALLY FOUND OURSELVES ON THE DEFENSIVE. OUR ACE IN HOLE IN THIS PERIOD WAS AN ISRAEL WHICH WE MADE SO STRONG THAT SOVIET MILITARY AID TO SYRIA, IRAQ, EGYPT, AND OTHERS WAS INVALIDATED AND DISCREDITED. ISRAELI STRENGTH SAVED THE CONSERVATIVE STATES: FOR INSTANCE, ISRAEL DEFEATING EGYPT IN 1967 FORCED THE THEN RADICAL EGYPTIANS TO WITHDRAW FROM YEMEN WHERE THEY THREATENED KINGDOM. ISRAELI STRENGTH IN 1970 DETERRED SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN TOTTERING JORDAN. ISRAELI MILITARY STRENGTH HAD ANOTHER HIGHLY VALUABLE COROLLARY FOR US  
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IN THAT IT MADE OUR DIRECT INTERVENTION IN THE AREA UN-NECESSARY.

4. IN 1973 AFTER OCTOBER WAR WE FINALLY WENT ON DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE IN SETTLEMENT EFFORTS AFTER YEARS OF ACCOMMODATING NO WAR NO PEACE SITUATION. WITH INITIATIVE WE GOT MUCH OF THE SUPPORT OF ARAB NATIONALISM. OBVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, ARAB FRUSTRATION WITH EARLIER CONFRONTATION TACTICS ALSO PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN CRUCIAL ARAB SHIFTS ON ALIGNMENT WITH US AND SETTLEMENT TERMS WITH ISRAEL. WE ALSO BENEFITTED IN POST-73 PERIOD FROM AN EXTRAORDINARY INTER-ARAB SHIFT OF POWER WHICH BROUGHT FORMERLY DEFENSIVE AND WEAK SAUDIS INTO ROLE OF STRONG AND HIGHLY CONSERVATIVE LEADERSHIP.

5. THUS, SINCE 1973, A HUGE SOVIET INVESTMENT IN AID AND PROPAGANDA, STRETCHING OVER 20-YEAR PERIOD, HAS BEEN LARGELY UNDERMINED. IN MIDDLE EAST TODAY SOVIETS HAVE LITTLE TO OFFER IN TRADE AND NOTHING IN ECONOMIC MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT OR ADVICE. THEIR EFFORTS EDUCATE ARABS HAVE LOST ALMOST ALL PRESTIGE. THEY CONTRIBUTE NEXT TO NOTHING TO DIPLOMATIC PROCESS, EITHER OF THIRD WORLD OR ARAB WORLD.

THEIR ECONOMIC AID IS SMALL AND NOT VALUED HIGHLY,  
ARABS SEE SOVIET CULTURE AS STUFFY, FORMAL, IRRELEVANT;  
AMERICAN CULTURE, BY CONTRAST, IS A BIT WILD BUT MUCH MORE  
INTERESTING. SOVIET SOCIETY IS NOT ADMIRER; UNLIKE OUR  
OWN, THE SOVIET UNION ISN'T DEMOCRATIC, ISN'T TOLERANT OF  
RELIGION AND RACE, ISN'T EVOLVING OR FREE. SOVIETS ARE  
FALLING BEHIND IN ARAB ESTIMATE EVEN IN HOW WELL THEY  
PROVIDE FOR WELFARE OF THEIR MUCH DISCUSSED WORKERS AND PEASANTS.  
SOVIET SCIENCE IS REGARDED AS SECOND-RATE BY ARABS.

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O 161335Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY SANA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5706  
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4  
CHUSMTM DHAHRAN  
USMTM RIYADH  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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6. THUS, NOT ONLY WAS SOVIET POSITION ERODING IN ARAB  
WORLD -- IN EGYPT, SUDAN, NORTH YEMEN, FOR INSTANCE --  
BUT POLITICAL BASIS FOR RESTORING IT WAS ERODING.

7. AT THIS JUNCTURE, ROUGHLY BEGINNING 1977, SOVIETS WERE  
PRESENTED WITH PARTICULARLY DISAGREEABLE EXTENSION  
OF THEIR DILEMMA INTO SOUTHERN PART OF RED SEA.

8. SAUDIS WERE PUSHING THEIR LUCK WITH SOMALIA, AND  
SOUTH YEMEN. SOVIETS RESPONDED WITH OFFER -- BROUGHT TO  
AREA BY CASTRO -- OF SOME KIND OF ALLIANCE OR ENTENTE.  
SOVIETS WERE BACKING IT UP WITH PROMISES OF ARMS AND VERY  
LARGE ECONOMIC AID FUND.

9. SAUDIS STOPPED THIS EFFORT DEAD IN ITS TRACKS. AS

WE REPORTED IN SANA 1222 OF MARCH 77, SAUDIS GOT SOMALIS AND SOUTH YEMENIS TO JOIN NORTH YEMEN AND SUDAN IN QUADRI-PARTITE CONFERENCE IN TAIZ. SAUDIS LOOKED FOR CEMENT IN  
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THIS RELATIONSHIP TO COME FROM SAUDI MONEY PLUS, FOR SOMALIA, ANNEXATION OF OGADEN AND PERHAPS DJIBOUTI. FOR SALEM IT WOULD COME IN FORM OF STRENGTH AGAINST HIS RIVAL ABD AL-FATTAH ISMAIL AND, INEVITABLY, HEAVY SAUDI DOSES OF CASH. FOR YEMEN, IT WAS MORE CASH, AND A LEADER-SHIP ROLE WHICH ENHANCED HAMDI'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OVER THE TRIBES. SAUDI PROGRAM HAD MILITARY AID COMPONENT EVEN THOUGH SAUDIS HAD TO HOPE TO TURN TO US OR FRENCH FOR EQUIPMENT.

10. WE SPECULATED IN SANA 1222 THAT "FAILURE TO CONSOLIDATE POSITION IN HORN WHICH COMPARABLE TO THEIR POSITION IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE WOULD BE SERIOUS STRATEGIC SETBACK FOR SOVIETS IN AFRICA." IT ALSO HAD POTENTIAL TO ELIMINATE SOVIET INFLUENCE ALONG NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN -- RED SEA OIL ROUTES, LEAVING SOVIETS IN TRUNCATED ETHIOPIA WITH UN-POPULAR, UNSTABLE RADICAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD BE PREY TO SAME SAUDI TACTICS IN FUTURE.

11. IF ALL THIS IS TRUE, THEN SOVIETS MAY HAVE DECIDED GALVANIC EFFORT WAS NEEDED TO BREAK PINNERS WHICH THREATENED PLUCK THEM OUT OF LOWER END OF RED SEA JUST AS THEY HAD EARLIER BEEN PLUCKED FROM NORTHERN END. THAT EFFORT STARTED WITH MASSIVE MILITARY DELIVERIES TO ETHIOPIA AND HARSH PROSECUTION OF WAR THERE AGAINST SOMALIA WITH CUBAN LEVEES. IT CONTINUED IN SOUTH YEMEN WITH SUPPORT FOR COUP WHICH KILLED PRESIDENT AL-GHASHMI IN NORTH AS WELL AS PRESIDENT ALI IN SOUTH. SOVIETS HAVE DECISIVELY DEFEATED SAUDIS AND OTHER LOCAL FOES. THEIR POSITION OF STRENGTH IN THIS CORNER OF WORLD IS FORMIDABLE AND THEY HAVE ADOPTED NEW TACTIC OF ALLIANCE WITH MOST RADICAL LOCAL GROUP PLUS DIRECT INTERVENTION.

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12. USG, FOR VARIETY OF REASONS, DID NOTHING THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD OF SAUDI REVERSAL. OF COURSE, SO FAR AS WE IN SANA KNOW, USG HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED ABOUT SAUDI PLANS IN ADVANCE AND HAD NO GOOD REASON TO BAIL OUT THE SOMALIS WHEN THEY GOT IN OVER THEIR HEADS. HOWEVER, WE SEEMED TO HAVE LOOKED AT THE PROBLEM IN TERMS OF ITS PIECES, THE

SOMALIS ON ONE HAND, THE SOUTH YEMENIS ON ANOTHER HAND,  
AND THEN THERE WAS DJIBOUTI -- WHAT TO DO ABOUT THAT? --  
AND THOSE ERITREANS WHOM THE ISRAELIS WANTED US TO HELP  
CRUSH. WE HAD TWO BUREAUS INVOLVED IN STATE DEPARTMENT  
AND NO RPT NO REGIONAL OR GLOBAL VIEW AIMED AT USSR. WE  
WOULD OFFER THEM REASONABLE INDUCEMENTS ON SALT AND TRADE  
AND THEY WOULD, WITHOUT OUR SENDING ARMS, LIMIT THEIR  
BEHAVIOR AND GOALS IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS.

13. AS WE SEE MATTER NOW, SOVIETS HAVE FOUND TOOL TO  
BEGIN TO UNDO TROUBLES WHICH THEY SUFFERED IN LAST FIVE  
YEARS IN MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA. TOOL IS GIVING (LOTS OF)  
ARMS TO RADICALS, SUPPORTING THEM DIRECTLY WHEN CHIPS ARE  
DOWN. RADICALS WILL DO FOR SOVIETS WHAT ISRAELIS DID FOR US.  
TOOL WORKS, AND WELL. WHY SHOULD THEY GIVE IT UP.  
SO: YAR AND OMAN ARE NEXT.

14. SOVIET PRESSURE COULD BUT NEED NOT TAKE FORM OF  
DIRECT ATTACK EARLY IN GAME. SOVIETS DON'T NECESSARILY  
WANT WAR AND, ANYWAY, REAL GOALS ARE SAUDI ARABIA AND  
GULF OIL PRODUCERS. SOVIET TACTIC IS TO DO ALL IT CAN TO  
DISCREDIT US AS DEPENDABLE FRIEND OF PENINSULAR STATES AND  
CREATE SECURE POSITION (AND BASES) ON RIM OF PENINSULA  
FROM WHICH TO MOVE INTO REST OF AREA WHEN TIME IS RIGHT.

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FM AMEMBASSY SANA  
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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4  
CHUSMTM DHAHRAN  
USMTM RIYADH  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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15. THAT'S WHAT MAKES OUR RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED KHALID LETTER SO IMPORTANT. THAT'S WHY SAUD SAYS HIS GOVERNMENT REGARDS THAT RESPONSE AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN CAMP DAVID TALKS. SAUDIS KNOW DANGERS OF ISOLATION. THEY KNOW THEIR OWN MILITARY WEAKNESS. THEY WANT TO CONTAIN SOVIETS IN SOUTH YEMEN WITH STRONG YAR DEFENSE. THIS IS FIRST BUT ESSENTIAL STEP TO MAKING ECONOMIC BOYCOTT, PROPAGANDA EFFORT, YAR CONDEMNATION OF SOUTH, WORK TO DETRIMENT OF RADICAL HEGEMONY IN PDRY, WORK TO BRING FORTH NEW SALEM RUBBAYYA ALL. IT IS ONLY AND GOOD ALTERNATIVE TO WAR.

16. WE SHOULD COOPERATE WITH SAUDIS FOR OUR OWN GOOD AS WELL AS THEIRS.  
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## Message Attributes

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**To:** STATE  
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